The metaphysical problem of other minds
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
This paper presents a distinctively metaphysical version of the problem of other minds and offers subjectivism as a way of coming to terms with it. Published version (open access)

Self-knowledge and the Paradox of Belief Revision
The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (forthcoming)
This paper presents a paradox attending the idea of rational belief revision and argues that we may be able to see a way out of it if we assume that rational agents are systematically aware of their own beliefs as beliefs they have. Published version (open access)

Realism, relativism, and subjective facts (with G. Pravato)
Synthese (forthcoming)
This paper recommends subjectivism as a position capable of reconciling a relativist treatment of the propositions belonging to a given domain of discourse with a realist attitude towards the matters arising in that domain. Published version

Disjunction and the logic of grounding
Erkenntnis (forthcoming)
This paper challenges the widely accepted idea that the logical form of a true sentence can be used as a guide to the metaphysical grounds of the fact stated by that sentence. Published version

A defence of Lichtenberg
Episteme (forthcoming).
This paper argues that one cannot acquire knowledge of the fact that one is thinking simply in virtue of being introspectively aware of one's own thinking. Published version

Appearance, reality and the meta-problem of consciousness
Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6), 2020: 120-130. 
This paper articulates an 'ontological' and a 'cosmological' argument against illusionist accounts of phenomenal consciousness.

Eyes directed outward (with P. Conlan and C. Wright)
The Journal of Philosophy 117 (6), 2020: 332-351. 2020.
This is a review essay of Alex Byrne's book Transparency and Self-Knowledge (OUP, 2018).

Leibniz and the problem of temporary truths
The Leibniz Review,  27, 2017: 31-63
Leibniz's Problem of Temporary Truths is that of explaining how there can be temporarily true propositions if the truth of a proposition is a matter of concept-containment, as Leibniz held.  This paper presents a new approach to this problem, based on the idea that a concept can be consistent at one time and inconsistent at another. Penultimate Draft / Published Version

Three questions about immunity to error through misidentification
Erkenntnis 82 (3), 2017: 603-623.
This paper outlines a new framework for thinking about the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions, and argues that one prominent attempt to explain this phenomenon is unsuccessful.  Penultimate Draft / Published Version

Multiple reference and vague objects
Synthese194 (7), 2017: 2645-2666.
This paper advocates a novel account of the semantics of terms purportedly referring to vague objects. It is argued that each such term multiply refers to several precise objects instead of being indeterminate in reference among them. Penultimate draft / Published Version

Subjectivism and the mental 
Dialectica 70 (3), 2016: 311-342.
This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically different from all other mental states, even if only subjectively so. It is argued that such a view can dissolve certain long-standing puzzles concerning the unity of consciousness, the contents of self-awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge.
Penultimate draft / Published Version

Specialness and Egalitarianism
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3), 2013: 248-257.
This paper uses cross-temporal grounding as a way of reconciling the so-called “A-theory” of time with the intuition that past, present and future times are all equally real. Penultimate draft / Published Version

Leibnizian aggregates are not mind-dependent entities
Studia Leibnitiana 44 (2), 2012: 193-211
This paper argues that, according to Leibniz's view of entia per aggregationem, there are (or, at any rate, there could be) aggregates that are entirely mind-independent.
Penultimate draft / Published Version

Complexity, Existence and infinite analysis
The Leibniz Review 22, 2012: 9-36
This paper argues that, on Leibniz's infinite-analysis account of contingency, the a priori proof of a contingent truth is infinitely long because it involves an infinitely long comparison between the actual and the merely possible. Penultimate draft / Published Version

Coates, P. & S. Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness (Oxford University Press)
The Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming. 

Ciuni, R., Miller, K. & G. Torrengo (eds.), New Papers on the Present (Philosophia Verlag, Basic Philosophical Concepts, Munich) 
Dialectica 69 (1): 148-53.