"Leibniz and the problem of temporary truths", The Leibniz Review, forthcoming. 
Leibniz's Problem of Temporary Truths is that of explaining how there can be temporarily true propositions if the truth of a proposition is a matter of concept-containment, as Leibniz held.  This paper presents a new approach to this problem, based on the idea that a concept can be consistent at one time and inconsistent at another. 

"Three questions about immunity to error through misidentification", Erkenntnis 82 (3), 2017: 603-623.
This paper outlines a new framework for thinking about the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions and argues that one prominent attempt to explain this phenomenon is unsuccessful.  Penultimate Draft / Published Version


“Multiple reference and vague objects”, Synthese194 (7), 2017: 2645-2666.
This paper advocates a novel account of the semantics of terms purportedly referring to vague objects. It is argued that each such term multiply refers to several precise objects instead of being indeterminate in reference among them. Penultimate draft / Published Version


“Subjectivism and the mental”, Dialectica 70 (3), 2016: 311-342.
This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically different from all other mental states, even if only subjectively so. It is argued that such a view can dissolve certain long-standing puzzles concerning the unity of consciousness, the contents of self-awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge.
Penultimate draft / Published Version


“Specialness and Egalitarianism”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3), 2013: 248-257.
This paper uses cross-temporal grounding as a way of reconciling the so-called “A-theory” of time with the intuition that past, present and future times are all equally real. Penultimate draft / Published Version


“Leibnizian Aggregates Are Not Mind-Dependent Entities”, Studia Leibnitiana 44 (2), 2012:
193-211.
This paper argues that, according to Leibniz's view of entia per aggregationem, there are (or, at any rate, there could be) aggregates that are entirely mind-independent.
Penultimate draft / Published Version


“Complexity, Existence and Infinite Analysis”, The Leibniz Review 22, 2012: 9-36.
This paper argues that, on Leibniz's infinite-analysis account of contingency, the a priori proof of a contingent truth is infinitely long because it involves an infinitely long comparison between the actual and the merely possible. Penultimate draft / Published Version



“Review of Ciuni, R., Miller, K. & G. Torrengo (eds.), New Papers on the Present (Philosophia Verlag, Basic Philosophical Concepts, Munich)”, Dialectica 69 (1): 148-53. Penultimate draft / Published Version