Realism, relativism, and subjective facts (with G. Pravato)
Synthese (forthcoming)
This paper recommends subjectivism as a position capable of reconciling a relativist treatment of the propositions belonging to a given domain of discourse with a realist attitude towards the matters arising in that domain. Published version


Disjunction and the logic of grounding
Erkenntnis (forthcoming)
This paper challenges the widely accepted idea that the logical form of a true sentence can be used as a guide to the metaphysical grounds of the fact stated by that sentence. Published version


Appearance, reality and the meta-problem of consciousness
Journal of Consciousness Studies (forthcoming).
This paper articulates an 'ontological' and a 'cosmological' argument against illusionist accounts of phenomenal consciousness.


A defence of Lichtenberg
Episteme (forthcoming).
This paper argues that one cannot acquire knowledge of the fact that one is thinking simply in virtue of being introspectively aware of one's own thinking. Published version


Leibniz and the problem of temporary truths
The Leibniz Review,  27, 2017: 31-63
Leibniz's Problem of Temporary Truths is that of explaining how there can be temporarily true propositions if the truth of a proposition is a matter of concept-containment, as Leibniz held.  This paper presents a new approach to this problem, based on the idea that a concept can be consistent at one time and inconsistent at another. Penultimate Draft / Published Version

 
Three questions about immunity to error through misidentification
Erkenntnis 82 (3), 2017: 603-623.
This paper outlines a new framework for thinking about the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions, and argues that one prominent attempt to explain this phenomenon is unsuccessful.  Penultimate Draft / Published Version


Multiple reference and vague objects
Synthese194 (7), 2017: 2645-2666.
This paper advocates a novel account of the semantics of terms purportedly referring to vague objects. It is argued that each such term multiply refers to several precise objects instead of being indeterminate in reference among them. Penultimate draft / Published Version


Subjectivism and the mental 
Dialectica 70 (3), 2016: 311-342.
This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically different from all other mental states, even if only subjectively so. It is argued that such a view can dissolve certain long-standing puzzles concerning the unity of consciousness, the contents of self-awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge.
Penultimate draft / Published Version


Specialness and Egalitarianism
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3), 2013: 248-257.
This paper uses cross-temporal grounding as a way of reconciling the so-called “A-theory” of time with the intuition that past, present and future times are all equally real. Penultimate draft / Published Version


Leibnizian Aggregates Are Not Mind-Dependent Entities
Studia Leibnitiana 44 (2), 2012: 193-211
This paper argues that, according to Leibniz's view of entia per aggregationem, there are (or, at any rate, there could be) aggregates that are entirely mind-independent.
Penultimate draft / Published Version


Complexity, Existence and Infinite Analysis
The Leibniz Review 22, 2012: 9-36
This paper argues that, on Leibniz's infinite-analysis account of contingency, the a priori proof of a contingent truth is infinitely long because it involves an infinitely long comparison between the actual and the merely possible. Penultimate draft / Published Version





Coates, P. & S. Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness (Oxford University Press)
The Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming. 

Ciuni, R., Miller, K. & G. Torrengo (eds.), New Papers on the Present (Philosophia Verlag, Basic Philosophical Concepts, Munich) 
Dialectica 69 (1): 148-53.